Hastings Law Journal
Volume 66 | Issue 3

Article 12

4-2015

Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements
Kevin M. Clermont

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 Hastings L.J. 643 (2015).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol66/iss3/12

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Clermont-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete)

3/23/2015 5:09 PM

Governing Law on Forum-Selection
Agreements
Kevin M. Clermont*
The task of determining which law governs a contractual choice-of-forum clause is an
enigma to courts. The key to its solution lies at the very heart of the subject, where one
encounters its most celebrated riddle: Which law governs when the parties have also
agreed to a choice-of-law clause—that is, does a court first test the forum-selection
clause under the law of the seised forum, or does one first look at the parties’ choice of
law to apply the chosen law to the forum-selection clause?
This chicken-or-egg mystery throws courts into contortions. Prior commentators have
opted for the chosen law. But differentiated cases, policy arguments, and doctrinal
consistency all support applying lex fori to enforceability of the forum-selection
agreement—while applying the chosen law as to the agreement’s interpretation or, in
the absence of a choice-of-law clause, the chosen court’s law.

* Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell University. The Author thanks Alyssa Chen, William Dodge,
David Hoffman, Stephen Sachs, and Joe Singer for helpful comments.
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Introduction
The key to solving the enigma of which law governs a contractual
choice-of-forum clause lies at the very heart of the subject, where one
encounters its most celebrated riddle:1 Which law governs when the
parties have also agreed to a choice-of-law clause—does a court first look
under the law of the seised forum at the forum-selection clause, or does a
court first look at the parties’ choice of law to apply the chosen law to the
forum-selection clause—which comes first? This mysterious “conundrum
[of] the chicken or the egg”2 throws courts and commentators into
“conflict-of-laws contortions.”3
To illustrate the confusion generated when a choice-of-law clause
appears together with a forum-selection clause, imagine the following
hypothetical:

1. “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an
enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” Winston Churchill, We Will
Deal in Performances, Not Promises, BBC Radio Broadcast (Oct. 1, 1939), in Vital Speeches of the
Day, Oct. 1939, at 12.
2. Beilfuss v. Huffy Corp., 685 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing interaction of
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses). Incidentally, assume that a chicken and a half lay an egg
and a half in a day and a half. How many eggs does one chicken lay in one day? See Erryn Bard,
Comment to One Chicken, One Day, Math Forum @ Drexel (Apr. 19, 2002, 10:20 AM),
http://mathforum.org/library/drmath/view/60419.html.
3. Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 291, 347 (1988) (discussing judicial
reaction to interaction of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses).
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A consumer contract, between a foreign corporation and a local
person, contains a predispute forum-selection clause making the
corporation’s home court the sole proper forum. Because the
corporation knew that U.S. law would hold the forum-selection clause
unenforceable on public policy grounds, the corporation induced the
consumer to agree to a choice of its home country’s law, which favors
forum-selection clauses. The consumer brings a tort claim arising from
the contract in her home court in the United States. The corporate
defendant moves to dismiss, invoking the forum-selection clause against
the plaintiff. Which law governs the enforceability and interpretation of
the forum-selection clause, the law of the U.S. court or the foreign
law?

Nonetheless, I shall try to show that there is little reason for the confusion.
Part I will set the context for contemplating the enigma. Part II will show
that the cases, but not the commentators, give a solid solution in their
holdings and rationales: apply lex fori for enforceability of the forumselection agreement while applying the chosen law for its interpretation.
Part III will demonstrate that this solution conforms nicely to the rest of
the neighboring legal terrain, and in particular to the intermingled Erie
question on forum-selection agreements.

I. General Context
Today, parties have significant powers to select a forum, even in
advance of dispute.4 They can do so in a so-called forum-selection clause
or agreement, which is a contractual provision establishing a place for
specified litigation between them. The agreement overcomes territorial
jurisdiction, venue, and related defenses, with valid consent able to override
even the constitutionally based aspects of those defenses. Under modern
law, courts will usually give effect to “prorogation” or permissive
agreements, which, on a nonexclusive basis, authorize suit at a place
despite otherwise applicable law. Additionally, the parties generally may,
by a “derogation” or mandatory agreement, restrict on an exclusive basis
any potential litigation to one or more courts.
Parties come to such agreements, and they do so frequently, for a
variety of reasons. One side might be imposing a preferred forum on the
other, or both parties might be seeking a neutral, convenient, efficient, or
expert forum. In any event, the parties will consequently be able to plan
their affairs with greater certainty, and they will be able to reduce
eventual litigation over forum selection and reduce the risk of parallel
litigation in multiple forums. Accordingly, forum-selection clauses are
becoming more and more important in practice. Good lawyers increasingly

4. See generally Gary B. Born & Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in
United States Courts ch. 5 (5th ed. 2011) (providing sources for Part I’s overview). The agreement
can be asymmetrical, applying differently to the two parties. See id. at 509.

Clermont-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete)

646

3/23/2015 5:09 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:643

try to contract their clients’ way around the morass of the law on authority
to adjudicate, and to do so in a way that advantages their clients.
A. Distinction Between Enforceability and Interpretation
With certainty being a major incentive, it becomes imperative for
the parties to foresee what law will apply to the forum-selection clause.
Its legal effect could come up in various settings. The most important is
when a lawsuit is brought in some court, a challenge is then made to
jurisdiction or venue, and a party invokes the clause to support or to refute
the challenge.5 Will the seised court enforce and interpret the clause so
as to uphold the parties’ chosen place for suit?
Obviously, not all forum-selections clauses get enforced, even in a
jurisdiction that has embraced enforceability in principle. At the least,
the usual requirements of and defenses to contractual validity still apply,
although in applying them the court will treat the clause as a separable
contract. Thus, the resistor might show fraud, duress, undue influence,
lack of assent, overweening bargaining power, overreaching, impossibility,
or unconscionability as to the clause. Also, the court might invoke a
concept of public policy, typically narrow, to strike down the clause.
Many more of the litigated cases, however, turn on how to interpret
these clauses, most often as a result of the drafting lawyers’ failings.
Office lawyers need to know a lot of law, including choice of law, to

5. A different setting where a contractual choice of forum could come up would be where one party
seeks to enjoin litigation that is proceeding elsewhere in possible violation of a forum-selection agreement.
See Szymczyk v. Signs Now Corp., 606 S.E.2d 728, 733 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (applying the law of Florida on
enforceability, where the parties executed the contract choosing Florida law and a Florida forum).
Another setting would be in the course of recognition of a judgment rendered in possible
violation of the forum-selection clause. The fact is that the doctrines of full faith and credit and of
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction would moot most such questions through the operation of
preclusion, except in two situations. First, an American default judgment could violate the forumselection clause. The primary question would be whether the judgment was validly rendered. The
recognition court should apply the rendering court’s jurisdictional law. The consequent question is
whether the rendering court, under its own law, would view violation of the forum-selection clause as
undoing validity—which is highly unlikely. Of course, courts sometimes go astray in formulating the
question. See, e.g., Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1013–14 (S.D. W. Va.
1976) (allowing a federal collateral attack on a New York state default judgment for lack of
jurisdiction because the forum-selection clause designating a New York forum was unenforceable
under West Virginia law, even though the contract chose New York law). But most courts will respect
the rendering court’s law. See Hoffman v. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd., 643 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1981)
(disallowing a West Virginia federal collateral attack on a New York state default judgment and saying,
“[w]e disapprove of Leasewell to the extent that it holds otherwise”). Second, in the situation of a
foreign-country default judgment, under the looser restrictions of comity, a court in the United States may
decline recognition based on violation of a forum-selection clause that is enforceable under the U.S.
court’s law. See Diamond Offshore (Berm.), Ltd. v. Haaksman, 355 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. App. 2011);
Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 1130–31; Ronald A. Brand, Federal Judicial Center International
Litigation Guide: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 74 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 491, 522
(2013).
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negotiate and write a forum-selection clause effectively and clearly.
Therefore, in addition to the issue of enforceability (including validity
concerns),6 serious problems of interpretation (including construction
rules)7 plague the judicial treatment of forum-selection clauses.
B. Evolution of Law on Forum-Selection Clauses
Such party autonomy did not reign in the old days, although it was
not completely unknown. Party choice had influence in the outpost of
admiralty law, where the law first felt the “practical problems created by
the intersection of an expansive jurisdictional grant in admiralty with a
highly mobile litigant pool.”8 Since the eighteenth century, admiralty
courts have been enforcing some forum-selection agreements, eventually
doing so within the context of forum non conveniens.9 For an additional
inroad made by party choice, one could point to the long-established role
of post-dispute consent in bestowing territorial authority to adjudicate.10
Starting in middle of the twentieth century, however, there was a
decided shift from mainly treating forum-selection clauses as per se
unenforceable for infringement of sovereignty (no bestowal or ouster of
jurisdiction being the old slogan) to mainly letting parties select their
forum in growing recognition of party autonomy (freedom of contract being
the new slogan).11 American courts shifted from a view that authority to

6. Cf. William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It
Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 9, 16–21 (2006) (distinguishing
the concepts of enforceability and validity); Jason Webb Yackee, Choice of Law Considerations in the
Validity & Enforcement of International Forum Selection Agreements: Whose Law Applies?,
9 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 43, 47–62 (2004); Matthew J. Sorensen, Note, Enforcement of
Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court After Atlantic Marine, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2521, 2546
n.227 (2014).
7. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 204 cmt. a (1988) (distinguishing the
concepts of interpretation and construction).
8. David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection
Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 973, 978 (2008).
9. See id. at 993–1015.
10. See Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261, 264 (D. Minn. 1942); Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 32 (1988).
11. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–97 (1991) (even more expansively
enforcing a forum-selection agreement, while seemingly recognizing as exceptions only fraud in
inclusion of the clause or an unreasonably chosen forum); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1, 8–15 (1972) (generally approving forum-selection clauses); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964) (approving the defendant’s predispute waiver of objections to
territorial jurisdiction); Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.)
(“We are persuaded that the only good reason for treating a forum selection clause differently from
any other contract (specifically, from the contract in which the clause appears) is the possibility of
adverse effects on third parties. Where that possibility is slight, the clause should be treated like any
other contract. What is more, if any inconvenience to third parties can be cured by a change of venue
under section 1404(a), that is the route to follow, rather than striking down the clause.”); cf. Peter
Hay et al., Conflict of Laws 544–45 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing comparable state developments). See
generally Michael D. Moberly & Carolyn F. Burr, Enforcing Forum Selection Clauses in State Court,
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adjudicate is largely a matter for the sovereign and not the parties to
decide, through a grudging acceptance of party agreements, toward a
perhaps overly enthusiastic embrace of freedom of contract even in the
face of uneven bargaining capabilities and powers. Where the optimum
lies and where American law will end up are still matters of debate and
evolution.
To understand the current law, one should remember to frame the
modern elevation of party autonomy as shifting the preexisting law on
forum-selection agreements rather than creating a completely new
approach.12 The image of a shift conveys the idea of changed emphases
among the component factors.
As suggested, the old view emphasized the idea that it was for the
sovereign to decide what the sovereign’s courts could or could not do; it
was not for the parties to make private agreements as to the availability
of public remedies. Forum shopping, all by itself, appeared unseemly. In
particular, it seemed better to head off any abuse by one side in
contracting for an overly favorable court, especially when the other side
included local litigants or individuals with weak bargaining power.
The new view drew vigor from the modern value placed on freedom of
contract. Modern legal systems have come to see territorial jurisdiction
and venue as largely protections for the parties, and thus waivable, rather
than as pure expressions of sovereign interest. At the same time, parties
increasingly need to protect themselves by contract from unexpected or
undesirable forums, especially in international commerce.
The persisting tensions between these policy arguments mean that
even today party autonomy does not prevail everywhere. Some U.S.
states still consider forum-selection clauses to be per se unenforceable
(Idaho, Iowa, and Montana),13 while other states sometimes ignore them
by giving them less weight than other contracts (as by treating them as a
factor in a discretionary forum non conveniens analysis) or subject them
to more defenses (such as imposing a vaguely defined but expansive test
for the reasonableness of the chosen forum). Foreign-country law might

39 Sw. U. L. Rev. 265 (2009). The courts were not alone in making the shift. See Model Choice of
Forum Act, reprinted in Willis L.M. Reese, Document, The Model Choice of Forum Act, 17 Am. J.
Comp. L. 292 (1969) (treating the uniform act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1968 but withdrawn in 1975); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 80 (1988). The shift continues, as shown by the new Hague Convention, signed by the United States
but not yet in force, that would extend the effectiveness of forum-selection clauses. See Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005,
44 I.L.M. 1294 (2005) [hereinafter Hague Convention], discussed in Ronald A. Brand & Paul
Herrup, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2008). Finally, the shift was
not limited to forum-selection clauses, as shown, inter alia, by the earlier similar developments regarding
arbitration clauses. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 484–85, 1157–70.
12. See Marcus, supra note 8, at 1048.
13. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 469.
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go its own way, by which the country might refuse to enforce clauses against
consumers or might construe an ambiguous clause as being presumptively
exclusive.14 In sum, the question of which law will govern the forumselection clause remains one of great importance.
C. Judicial Choice of Law to Govern Forum-Selection Clauses
Assuming for the moment an absence of a choice-of-law clause, the
court where the case gets filed would have to choose among (1) its own
law on forum-selection clauses, (2) the law of the chosen court, and
(3) the law that will cover the underlying contract.15 Virtually no one
pushes for the third solution of looking to the place whose law will cover
the contract, perhaps because of the common distaste for the conflicts
process’s difficulty and uncertainty.16 A few authorities do urge application
of the chosen court’s law, on the view that the forum-selection agreement
is an implicit choice that the selected forum’s law should govern the
forum-selection agreement.17 Almost all American courts apply their
own law, the lex fori.18 Most do so with little or no thinking.19 There has
been an occasional suggestion of leavening the usual lex fori by looking to
other law for interpretation, as opposed to enforceability, of the clause.20
Those courts embracing lex fori have a powerful role model. In The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,21 the Supreme Court momentously
upheld a forum-selection clause. A Texan corporate plaintiff sued a
14. See Yackee, supra note 6, at 49, 52–62 (treating enforceability and interpretation in European law).
15. See Gary B. Born, International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements: Drafting
and Enforcing 138–39 (4th ed. 2013) (laying out the problem).
16. See, e.g., Eisaman v. Cinema Grill Sys., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 n.3 (D. Md. 1999)
(dictum favoring such an approach); Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 404 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014) (citing only Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm.
Co., 476 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007), in which there was actually a choice-of-law clause).
17. See, e.g., My Café-CCC, Ltd. v. Lunchstop, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 860, 864–65 (Tex. App. 2003);
Yackee, supra note 6, at 90–94 (advocating such an approach).
18. See, e.g., Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Willingham, 17 F.3d 123, 127–28 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying
federal law to interpretation of the forum-selection clause); Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Co.,
926 F.2d 865, 867 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Federal law governs the validity of the forum selection clause.”);
Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying federal law to enforceability of forumselection clause); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513–14 (9th Cir. 1988)
(applying federal law to enforceability and scope of the forum-selection clause); Yackee, supra note 6,
at 67–72 (describing this approach).
19. See Yackee, supra note 6, at 67 (“In practice, and with rare exceptions, United States courts
tend not to engage in explicit choice of law analysis when determining the validity and enforceability
of a given international [forum-selection agreement].”); id. at 69 (“This bias towards lex fori to supply
rules of enforceability . . . also extends to the enforcement of domestic [foreign-selection agreements].”); id.
at 89–90 (noting there are few reported decisions).
20. See, e.g., Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir.1990) (dictum) (Posner, J.)
(“Validity and interpretation are separate issues, and it can be argued that as the rest of the contract in
which a forum selection clause is found will be interpreted under the principles of interpretation followed by
the state whose law governs the contract, so should that clause be.”).
21. 407 U.S. 1, 4 n.4, 14 n.15 (1972).
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German corporate defendant in a Florida federal court, in admiralty, for
damage inflicted while the defendant was towing the plaintiff’s drilling
rig in the Gulf of Mexico. In their towage contract, the parties had
chosen a London forum. Then in the federal court, the defendant
invoked the forum-selection clause, but the plaintiff claimed it to be
unenforceable under the traditional American disfavor. Applying (while
overhauling) federal law, or here lex fori, the Supreme Court enforced
the clause, with hardly a preliminary thought on conflicts and with barely
a mention of English law.
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,22 the Supreme Court upheld
another forum-selection clause. A Washington state couple sued the Florida
corporate defendant in a Washington federal court, in admiralty, for
injury to the wife while cruising on the defendant’s ship off the coast of
Mexico, in the Pacific Ocean. In small print on the back pages of their
passenger ticket, there was a clause designating a Florida forum. Then in
the federal court, the defendant invoked the forum-selection clause but
the plaintiffs claimed it to be unenforceable. Applying (while extending)
federal law, or lex fori, the Supreme Court enforced the clause, with
scant consideration of choice of law.
More recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that the federal
statutes on transfer of venue or the federal doctrine of forum non
conveniens can override the forum-selection clause. According to
Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.23 and Atlantic Marine Construction
Co. v. U.S. District Court,24 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) can override any forumselection clause in federal court, allowing the chosen court to transfer to
a federal court where the case might have been brought absent the
clause. In cases where the preferable court is a foreign or state court, the
federal court may entertain the possibility that forum non conveniens will
trump a forum-selection clause agreeing on suit in that federal court.25
Still, “forum-selection clauses should control” in “all but the most
unusual cases.”26
Thus, the Supreme Court seems to have resolved the conflicts
question in favor of lex fori. In federal court, the lex fori, or federal law,
favors forum-selection clauses. The federal court will usually enforce any
valid clause. But the flexibility in determining the clause’s validity and in
the public policy safety valve render the decision, in the end, a discretionary

22. 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991) (“[F]ederal law governs the enforceability of the forum-selection
clause we scrutinize.”).
23. 487 U.S. 22, 28–30 (1988).
24. 134 S. Ct. 568, 577–79 (2013).
25. See id. at 580, 583 n.8. In this context, forum non conveniens works similarly, but maybe not
identically, to transfer of venue. See Robin Effron, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Forum Non
Conveniens, 66 Hastings L.J. 693, 711–16 (2015).
26. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582–83; cf. id. at 575, 581 (requiring “extraordinary circumstances”).
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one, somewhat like a transfer or forum non conveniens decision heavily
weighted in favor of the chosen forum.27

II. Effect of Choice-of-Law Clauses
The parties also have significant powers to select the governing law
for their contract. As a result, a choice-of-law clause frequently appears
together with a forum-selection clause.28 Even in a court that would
enthusiastically enforce the choice-of-law clause on the underlying
contract, perhaps on the ground of economic efficiency,29 it does not
follow that the parties’ choice of law should govern the separable forumselection clause. Even if the parties specifically intended their choice of

27. See Marcus, supra note 8, at 1015 (“Discretion meant that courts . . . had the ultimate power
to determine when court access doctrine should defer to the parties’ agreement.”); id. at 1013 (“The
term unreasonable described clauses that would not be enforced under the [discretionary]
approach.”). In the view of many, Stewart and Atlantic Marine do not mesh well with Bremen and
Carnival Cruise. See id. at 1021–26, 1041 (reconciling Stewart by taking a historical view of forumselection clauses); cf. Andrew D. Bradt, Atlantic Marine and Choice-of-Law Federalism, 66 Hastings
L.J. 617, 629–31 (2015) (stressing the difference between Stewart and Atlantic Marine). The way to
make sense of Stewart and Atlantic Marine is to recognize that the federal law on enforceability of forumselection clauses is ultimately a discretionary standard. If the court in its discretion finds the clause to be
enforceable, and if the competing court is federal, then the federal court makes a separate
discretionary decision based on § 1404(a) public-interest factors whether to override the choice of
forum. Because an enforceable forum-selection clause is just a factor, albeit now a huge one, in that
second decision on the appropriate federal court, transfer or retention or dismissal can very occasionally
follow despite the clause. This result is not jarring, however, because enforceability of the clause was
discretionary in the first place.
Atlantic Marine also ruled that a necessary condition for the venue in the transferor court
being “wrong” and so triggering 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is that the venue violates the requirements of the
federal venue laws, even if it violates a forum-selection clause. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577–79.
The discretionary standard makes some sense of this holding too. On the one hand, the parties’ clause
does not by itself make a venue right or wrong. A wrong venue under the transfer statute arguably
refers to places not designated by the federal venue laws, without regard to the eventual place of suit
pursuant to transfer, forum non conveniens, or party agreement. Cf. Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine
and the Future of Party Preference, 66 Hastings L.J. 675, 677 (2015) (noting “party preferences are
subordinate to legal directives”). On the other hand, use of § 1404(a) required the Court to create an
exception to the rule that transferor law applies to the transferred case. To avoid an inequitable
advantage to the agreement-breaching plaintiff, the chosen transferee court will apply its own law just
as it would have under § 1406(a). See 134 S. Ct. at 582–83. It thus would seem a smoother course for
the Court to have held a federal forum that is going to enforce a forum-selection clause by transfer is a
“wrong” venue under § 1406(a).
As an additional argument against the Court’s approach, the Court might not have managed
to cram all federal-to-federal forum-selection clause battles into § 1404(a) after all. Sometimes § 1406(a)
would seem to be the correct route. If the plaintiff sues in the chosen federal forum, but that forum is
otherwise wrong under the venue laws, then the motion to transfer would seem to lie under § 1406(a)
rather than § 1404(a), at least if the court finds the forum-selection clause unenforceable. See id. at 577
(“If [the case falls within the venue statute], venue is proper; if it does not, venue is improper, and the
case must be dismissed or transferred under § 1406(a).”); Bradley Scott Shannon, Enforcing ForumSelection Clauses, 66 Hastings L.J. 777, 780–81 (2015).
28. See Born, supra note 15, at 33.
29. See Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, The Law Market 56–60 (2009).
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law to govern their forum selection too, it still does not follow that their
chosen law should govern the forum-selection clause. It could instead be
that the court would choose to control its own jurisdiction and venue,
doing so by considering the forum-selection clause before the choice-oflaw clause. When these two clauses collide in such a manner, the chickenor-egg problem becomes more obvious, and confusion on the conflicts
issue suddenly explodes into open debate.
Because the parties choose a forum in large part to augment
certainty, the legal system should try to be clear on the extent of the
parties’ powers to select the governing law on forum choice. Thus far, the
system has failed miserably in clarifying whether the parties can choose
the law to govern forum-selection agreements.
A. Cases and Commentaries
If the parties have included a valid choice-of-law clause that
encompasses within its scope the forum-selection clause, then (1) the
usual reference to lex fori on the enforceability and interpretation of the
forum-selection clause must compete with (2) a conflicts rule that would
look to the chosen law. Other competing alternatives would include
dépeçage approaches that would apply lex fori to some issues concerning
the forum-selection clause and apply the chosen law to other such
issues,30 or even approaches that would require some aspects of the forumselection clause to pass muster under both laws.31
The typical treatise approach is to describe the American cases as
split between lex fori and the chosen law.32 That description suffers from
a serious selection effect: looking only at cases that decide the point is
inapt because they are a biased subset of the run of all cases (or all
disputes). The great mass of cases presenting the problem do not expressly
allude to it at all, be that the fault of the judges or the lawyers.33 The few
30. See Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A., 551 P.2d 1206, 1208–10 (Cal. 1976)
(applying the chosen law as to enforceability, but lex fori as to public policy and as to interpretation); cf.
Hague Convention, supra note 11, art. 6(a)–(c) (proposing treaty that would apply lex fori for parties’
capacity and for public policy, but the chosen law to see if the clause is “null and void”).
31. See Karlberg European Tanspa, Inc. v. JK-Josef Kratz Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH, 618 F. Supp.
344, 347 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (applying both German and federal law to enforceability); Born & Rutledge,
supra note 4, at 532 & n.180, 544. The most likely candidate for redundant application of law is public
policy restrictions. See Deere Credit, Inc. v. Grupo Granjas Marinas, S.A. de C.V., No. 4:03-CV-10381,
2004 WL 729123, at *2–4 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 3, 2004) (applying both lex fori and chosen law as to public
policy); Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Teton Builders, 106 P.3d 719, 723–26 (Utah 2005) (same); Born &
Rutledge, supra note 4, at 532 & n.179. But see infra note 54 (arguing against redundant treatment of
public policy).
32. E.g., Hay et al., supra note 11, at 1148 (“American courts are split between applying the law
of the forum qua forum and applying the chosen law if the choice-of-law clause is otherwise valid.”).
33. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 532; Mullenix, supra note 3, at 346 & n.292, 350 (citing
cases); id. at 348 (“In large measure, the scope of choice-of-law clauses combined with forum-selection
clauses has not been examined in any meaningful fashion.”); Yackee, supra note 6, at 77–79
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cases that discuss the problem tend to split; they draw all the attention of
treatise writers; the result is to make this puzzle look a good deal more
puzzling than it is.
What are the cases that ignore the problem doing? They, of course,
are applying lex fori. So, if we were to consider all American cases, we
would say that the vast majority apply lex fori. Indeed, it appears that the
courts “reflexively apply lex fori” even in the face of a choice-of-law
clause.34 We could almost say the question is settled.
Nevertheless, on the basis of policy, the few scholars who have
ventured into the thicket align in favor of applying the parties’ chosen
law, all the while acknowledging that the cases are against them.35
Therefore, one cannot rely on a headcount of cases. One must decide, as
between the case law and the scholarship, which has the better argument.
One needs to look more closely at the split in cases that actually
discuss the problem to see why the courts are doing what they are doing.
This closer look, surprisingly, reveals that the split is more superficial than
real. Yes, some cases apply lex fori despite the choice-of-law clause and
some cases apply the chosen law, but the two camps are often addressing
different subproblems. On the one hand, most cases apply lex fori to
questions of enforceability of a forum-selection clause,36 while a few others
apply the chosen law, usually after a bare reference to the existence of a

(discussing fault of judges and lawyers); id. at 63 (“Despite the multi-layered complexity of this choice
of law problem, United States courts rarely engage in explicit conflict of laws analysis when
determining whether an international [forum-selection agreement] is valid and enforceable.”).
34. Yackee, supra note 6, at 67; see J. Zachary Courson, Survey, Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd.: A New

Federal Standard—Applying Contracting Parties’ Choice of Law to the Analysis of Forum Selection
Agreements, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 597, 601 (2008) (“Overwhelmingly, courts have used lex fori in
interpreting and enforcing [forum-selection agreements] in international agreements, notwithstanding
the inclusion of [choice-of-law clauses].”).
35. Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 498, 532 (emphasizing freedom of contract as overriding
factor); Yackee, supra note 6, at 46, 84–88 (emphasizing parties’ need for certainty as overriding factor
in conflicts analysis); Courson, supra note 34, at 597 (stressing party autonomy, but focusing on a case
involving interpretation of a forum-selection clause).
36. See, e.g., Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Despite the presumptive
validity of choice-of-law clauses, our precedent indicates that federal law should be used to determine
whether an otherwise mandatory and applicable forum clause is enforceable . . . .”); Silva v. Encyclopedia
Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 388–89 (1st Cir. 2001) (applying federal law when the parties had
selected Illinois courts and Illinois state law); Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT Nederland
N.V., 145 F.3d 505, 509–10 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying federal law to choice of Dutch forum rather than
chosen Dutch law); Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 301–05 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying
federal law to dismiss in favor of chosen Peruvian forum rather than using chosen Peruvian law);
Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 159–62 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying federal law to choice of English
forum rather than chosen English law); Rudgayzer v. Google, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 151, 155 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (“A choice-of-law clause governs only substantive law, not procedural law. Questions of venue
and forum are procedural, so the enforceability of the forum-selection clause is governed by federal
law.” (citations omitted)); BNY AIS Nominees Ltd. v. Quan, 609 F. Supp. 2d 269, 273–74 (D. Conn.
2009) (upholding choice of Bermudan forum under federal law rather than under chosen Bermudan
law); Hay et al., supra note 11, at 1148 n.7 (citing state cases).
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choice-of-law clause.37 On the other hand, many cases apply the chosen
law to legal questions of interpretation,38 while more than a few cases
apply lex fori to interpretation of a forum-selection clause.39 Dissecting
the split, however, is but the first step in the analysis.
B. Policy Arguments
As the second step in the analysis, one needs to distill the arguments
for lex fori and for the chosen law. A residue of disagreement does remain
in the case law, and the disagreement exposes the relevant arguments.

37. See, e.g., Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 773 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Idaho 1989) (applying the
chosen Florida law, but construing it to mean that Florida would not uphold clause if it violated the public
policy of Idaho, which it did); Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Mass.
1995) (upholding clause after saying, “[t]herefore, in the absence of any substantial Massachusetts
public policy reason to the contrary, Massachusetts’s attitude toward the forum selection clause is
unimportant, and we should turn to the law of California to determine the effect of that clause”),
followed, Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 967 N.E.2d 580, 586 (Mass. 2012) (“Because the contract states that it
is to be governed and construed according to the laws of New York, we determine the validity of the
forum selection clause according to the law of our sister State.”).
38. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that “where a
contract contains both a valid choice-of-law clause and a forum selection clause, the substantive law
identified in the choice-of-law clause governs the interpretation of the forum selection clause, while
federal law governs the enforceability of the forum selection clause”); Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca
UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 648–51 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying chosen English law to interpret mandatoriness of
clause, but federal law to its enforceability); Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 431 (10th Cir. 2006)
(applying chosen Swiss law to interpret mandatoriness and scope of clause), noted in Courson, supra
note 34, at 621–22; AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P’ship, 740 F.2d 148, 155–56 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying
chosen Dutch law to interpreting mandatoriness of clause, but federal law to its enforceability);
Rudgayzer, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 156–57 (applying chosen California law to interpreting mandatoriness
and scope of clause); Global Link, LLC v. Karamtech Co., No. 06-CV-14938, 2007 WL 1343684, at *2–3
(E.D. Mich. May 8, 2007) (applying chosen Korean law to interpreting mandatoriness of clause).
39. See K & V Scientific Co. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 314 F.3d 494, 499–501
(10th Cir. 2002) (applying federal law to interpreting mandatoriness of clause despite chosen German
law and forum, a view apparently rejected by Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 431); Androutsakos v. M/V PSARA,
No. 02-1173-KI, 2004 WL 1305802, at *6–7 (D. Or. Jan. 22, 2004) (applying federal law to interpretation
despite chosen Greek law and forum). But some cases applying federal law to interpretation involved
lawyers who failed to argue the chosen law. See, e.g., Phillips, 494 F.3d at 386 (“However, the parties
neither objected to the district court’s citation to federal precedent in its interpretation of the clause
before us, nor construed the clause under English law in their briefs.”). More often, the cases applying
federal law to interpretation turn only on uncovering intent, diving into which the courts feel
comfortable without attention to the choice-of-law clause. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. G. Siempelkamp
GmbH, 29 F.3d 1095, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Because the clause states that ‘all’ disputes ‘shall’ be at
Siempelkamp’s principal place of business, it selects German court jurisdiction exclusively and is
mandatory.”); Dearborn Indus. Mfg. Co. v. Soudronic Finanz AG, No. 95 C 4414, 1997 WL 156589, at
*3–6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1997) (determining mandatoriness and scope from language), modifying 1996
WL 467245, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 1996); cf. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 204(a)
(1988) (applying for contracts the chosen law to the rules of construction but not to the task of
interpretation, although seemingly for the reason that interpretation turns on intent and so does not
typically raise issues of law). It is conceivable that a court could apply one law to construction and
another law to interpretation, but the sounder approach would be to recognize that the legal and
factual tasks of construction and interpretation are so intermingled as to call for the same governing law.
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Consider, initially, which law should govern enforceability of a forumselection clause when there is a choice-of-law clause.
Applying lex fori would further the following ends:
 Applying lex fori to the forum-selection clause allows the court
to control its own jurisdiction and venue, and to do so by uniform
rules.
 Lex fori would avoid the discomfort of sometimes allowing
foreign law to determine whether jurisdiction or venue exists in the
seised court.
 In some thin sense, jurisdiction and venue come first, and so
the court should decide those questions before performing a choiceof-law analysis.
 Lex fori would avoid the slight, and not insuperable, illogic
of assuming an enforceable forum-selection or choice-of-law clause
in order to choose the law to determine enforceability.
 For good reasons, courts do not normally interpret choiceof-law clauses to cover procedural matters;40 the enforceability of the
separable forum-selection clause, sensibly and practically considered,
appears procedural for this purpose.41
 Applying lex fori, rather than the chosen law, to the forumselection clause closes the door to abusive clauses: the parties could be
bootstrapping the forum-selection clause into enforceability by
choosing a very permissive law, and the stronger party could be forcing
the weaker party into an unfair forum applying unfair law.
 The risk of abuse would be especially great in consumer
contracts.
 Applying lex fori avoids all the usual difficulties of applying
foreign law, and also results in applying what the forum will most often
consider the forum-selection law that is better in light of a variety of
considerations, including economic efficiency.42
 Applying lex fori is consistent with analogous conflicts
practices.
 In the absence of a choice-of-law clause, almost all courts
conclude easily in favor of lex fori, while virtually no court selects the
law governing the contract under choice-of-law principles;43 it would
appear inconsistent to embrace the law governing the contract simply
because the parties selected the law.

40. See Born, supra note 15, at 161; Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 763, 774–75; Hay et al.,
supra note 11, at 1137–41.
41. But see Richard Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law 104–
10 (2012) (arguing that the clause’s status as a contract makes it a substantive matter). Of course, the
answer does not lie in a substance/procedure dichotomy, but in a sensitive consideration of conflicts
policies. See id. at 43.
42. See Daniel Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. Legal Analysis 245 (2014);
Joseph William Singer, Commentary, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Curtain: The Place of
Better Law in a Third Restatement of Conflicts, 75 Ind. L.J. 659 (2000); Verity Winship, Aligning Law
and Forum: The Home Court Advantage, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (2013).
43. See supra Part I.C.
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 Forum-selection clauses and arbitration clauses are very
similar in effect; lex fori governs the enforceability of the separable
arbitration clause, just as the Federal Arbitration Act44 and the New
York Convention45 govern in federal court and, by preemption, in
state court.46
 Forum-selection clauses and choice-of-law clauses are
somewhat similar in theory; lex fori governs at least the key issues of
enforceability of the choice-of-law clause, which also means that
there is no way to escape altogether applying lex fori.47
 Other countries seem generally to apply lex fori to forumselection clauses.48

Contrariwise, applying the parties’ chosen law would serve these ends:
 Applying the chosen law to the forum-selection clause fits the
modern indulgence of party autonomy, and so efficiently facilitates
private ordering, conforms to expectations, and increases certainty.
o Otherwise, the law will vary with the court selected by the
plaintiff, and so the parties will not be sure what law will apply on the
forum-selection clause and, hence, what law will apply to the rest of
the lawsuit.
o The lack of predictability would be especially detrimental in
international commercial contracts.
 Applying the chosen law, rather than lex fori, to the forumselection clause closes the door to abusive forum shopping: the plaintiff
could be undermining the agreement by choosing a court that will treat
the clauses in a way that favors the plaintiff.49

At a glance, it appears that the policies in favor of lex fori are more
numerous, if not stronger, than those against. Yet the most thorough article
on the subject, written by Professor Jason Yackee while he was a student,

44. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2015).
45. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–210.
46. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 1168–70, 1178, 1193; Hay et al., supra note 11, at
1149–52; cf. Yackee, supra note 6, at 87–88 (treating governing law on other issues concerning
arbitration clauses); infra text accompanying note 75 (treating impact of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938)). On how to handle a forum-selection clause and an arbitration clause in the same
contract, see Richard Garnett, Co-Existing and Conflicting Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses,
9 J. Private Int’l L. 361 (2013).
47. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. b (1988) (subjecting contractual
consent to lex fori); Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 758–63, 770–73 (looking more generally to lex
fori); Hay et al., supra note 11, at 1129–30; Woodward, supra note 6, at 18–21; cf. infra text
accompanying note 76 (treating impact of Erie, 304 U.S. 64). But see Yackee, supra note 6, at 87
(subjecting formal validity to the apparently chosen law).
48. See Yackee, supra note 6, at 72–74.
49. Other arguments have appeared on both sides, but I have omitted those that make little
sense. For example, a popular argument for applying the chosen law is that we should resort to
“normal conflicts reasoning.” See, e.g., id. at 84. When confronting a conflicts problem, advice to apply
normal conflicts reasoning does not advance the ball. What does it even mean here? I think it is an
argument against creating an exception to the chosen law’s governance of the contract. But lex fori
applies to many procedural matters in a suit on a contract. So, one just as easily could argue against
creating an exception to lex fori’s governance.
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came out solidly in favor of applying the chosen law.50 In his view, the
need for certainty carried the day.
In my view, however, his argument can be turned around by
supplementing it. The seised court may very well share strong interests
with other governments in fostering certainty through the parties’ exercise
of freedom of contract. But those interests have bounds. A sovereign will
not favor party autonomy over matters it wants to control itself. There is
nothing unusual, then, about imposing a limit on freedom of contract.
The seised court might want to specify its own jurisdiction and venue. It
would then decide that the parties cannot touch jurisdiction and venue in
certain ways.51
All that sounds like the long-acknowledged tension between sovereign
interest and party autonomy in the operation of forum selection. When
confronted with that tension, the modern mind reacts skeptically. We do
not swallow arguments about dreaded “bestowal” or “ouster” of territorial
authority to adjudicate, viewing the dread as nothing but “old-think.”
“The argument that such clauses are improper because they tend to
‘oust’ a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal
fiction.”52
We tend to bring that skepticism over from enforceability to the
different problem of governing law. But right there comes the logical
misstep. The problem is not whether to react to the old tension by
drawing the line more toward approval of forum-selection agreements.
Rather, the problem is to determine which sovereign has the predominant
interest in making the decision of where to draw the line between sovereign
interest and party autonomy. Not where to draw the line, but who gets to
draw the line?
Another way to make the point is to hypothesize policymakers who
feel the need to heighten certainty in private ordering. They would
address the local law on forum-selection clauses, not the local conflicts
law. The policy in play is freedom of contract, not whether the sovereign
should continue to limit freedom of contract in order to control its own
territorial authority extraterritorially. Indeed, if the policymakers were to
order abandonment of lex fori, they would be ceding control of judicial
authority, as well as of private ordering, to some foreign policymaker.

50. Id. at 46, 84–88. However, he would allow the seised court to apply, in addition, its own public
policy exception. See id. at 95–96.
51. For comparison, this kind of public policy defense to a forum-selection clause is equivalent to
saying that there are matters on which the parties cannot escape domestic law by choosing foreign law.
See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(b) cmt. g (1988) (“[A] fundamental policy
may be embodied in a statute which makes one or more kinds of contracts illegal or which is designed
to protect a person against the oppressive use of superior bargaining power.”).
52. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d
437, 439 (Fla. 1986).
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In brief, the issue here is not whether to approve forum-selection
agreements, but which sovereign gets to decide whether to approve such
agreements. Once framed as a typical conflicts problem, the answer appears
clearly. The seised court may feel interests in optimally liberalizing party
autonomy that compete with other sovereigns’ interests, and the forum
may not have an exclusive interest in optimizing its own jurisdiction and
venue; but the seised court’s sovereign has an extraordinarily strong
interest in deciding how much it will defer to others as to its jurisdiction
and venue. Why should a court let another sovereign manage its docket
or dictate access to it? This function is getting close to the heart of any
system of justice. What if the other sovereign blindly enforces forumselection agreements regardless of fairness, or what if the other sovereign
is one of those that refuses to enforce any such mandatory or even
permissive agreement? The role for the parties in closing or opening the
courthouse doors should matter to the seised court.
By interest analysis or the like,53 then, the seised court’s sovereign
has the predominant interest in being the one to decide where to draw
the line between sovereign interest and party autonomy. This metainterest, not in the content of the rules but in being able to specify that
content, indeed appears exclusive. The fact that the parties prefer another
law is irrelevant to the meta-interest, as are other sovereigns’ interests.
Recognizing the meta-interest decidedly swings the conflicts balance.
The court therefore should apply its own law on enforceability of forumselection agreements.54

53. See generally William M. Richman et al., Understanding Conflicts of Laws 175–76, 253–
54, 262–65, 267 (4th ed. 2013); Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws
Approach, 47 Cornell Int’l L.J. 63, 91–96, 110 (2014).
54. Given the notion that the seised court will govern its own jurisdiction and venue, it should not
apply any other government’s public policy doctrine. See Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 228
(2d Cir. 2014); Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 524–27. That conclusion raises the possibility of the
seised court sending a case to the chosen court, which would find the forum-selection clause contrary
to its own public policy. But that possibility is not a real problem because a seised court normally will
not send a case off to a chosen court that would refuse to entertain the case. That result follows under
lex fori because, one way or another, the contract law defenses to the clause will defeat it. See
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80 cmt. c (1988) (“A court will likewise entertain the
action if it finds that for some reason the courts of the chosen state would be closed to the suit or
would not handle it effectively or fairly.”); Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 501; cf. Hague
Convention, supra note 11, art. 6(d)–(e) (proposing treaty that would establish this rule), discussed in
Brand & Herrup, supra note 11, at 94 (describing the Convention’s provision against sending a case to
a chosen court that would not entertain it as “an analogue to a doctrine of frustration”). Similarly, in
the absence of contrary intention, courts normally will not apply the parties’ chosen law if it would
invalidate the contract. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. e (1988) (“If the
parties have chosen a law that would invalidate the contract, it can be assumed that they did so by
mistake.”); Hay et al., supra note 11, at 1134–35 (similar); cf. Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am.,
Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying a similar rule to parties’ choice of law that would invalidate
their forum selection).
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In this light, all of the above bulleted arguments now seem a mere
listing of advantages and disadvantages of lex fori. The meta-interest
argument seems different from them: It directly addresses the conflicts
question. It also addresses the subject in a very meaningful way. It not
only is a trump card in favor of lex fori, but will also imply some extensions
and limits, discussed below, as to application of lex fori to certain subsidiary
issues regarding forum-selection clauses.
Finally, the reader might think that the hypothetical from which I
departed was slanted toward a lex fori answer. I accordingly need to pose
an alternative hypothetical that favors application of the chosen law:
A post-dispute forum-selection clause adding the local corporation’s
home court as a proper forum is appended to a contract between
another state’s corporation and a local corporation, but is specifically
subjected to the contract’s choice-of-law clause. Because the parties
knew that the local corporation’s home law would hold the forumselection clause unenforceable on public policy grounds, the local
corporation pushed for a choice of the out-of-state corporation’s home
law, which favors forum-selection clauses. The local corporation brings
a contract claim in its home court. The out-of-state defendant moves to
dismiss. Which law governs the enforceability of the forum-selection
clause, the law of the seised court or the other state’s law?

The hypothetical now involves a post-dispute agreement rather than a
predispute agreement,55 a business-to-business contract rather than a
consumer contract,56 and a contract claim rather than a tort claim.57
These changes increase the chances that any governing law would treat
the forum-selection clause as enforceable, but they do not bear on what
law should govern.
This hypothetical also involves a prorogation rather than a derogation
agreement,58 a domestic rather an international contract,59 and an explicit
55. See Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1982)
(referring to “the traditional rule, which a diminishing number of jurisdictions still follow, that forum
selection clauses relating to future causes of action will be refused enforcement, while those relating to
existing causes of action will be enforced”).
56. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 481–82, 493 (suggesting some wariness in enforcing
forum-selection clauses against consumers); Linda S. Mullenix, Gaming the System: Protecting
Consumers from Unconscionable Contractual Forum-Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 Hastings
L.J. 719 (2015); cf. Hague Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(1)(a) (proposing treaty that would exclude
consumers from coverage).
57. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 486, 520–21, 546 (suggesting some wariness in
interpreting forum-selection clauses to include tort claims).
58. See id. at 462–63, 485, 498–502; cf. Robert C. Casad & Laura J. Hines, Jurisdiction and
Forum Selection § 4.19 (2d ed. 1999) (making the same point that derogation clauses are more
troublesome to enforce, but misusing the term “prorogation”); Mullenix, supra note 3, at 330
(minimizing the difference).
59. See Gen. Eng’g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 358 n.6 (3d Cir. 1986)
(“[T]he greater impact that a less stringent rule would have between parties to a private international
contract, where the question of forum selection is considerably more important than it would be in a
purely domestic contract, where the common law can be presumed to apply. . . . In any event, we
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rather than implicit subjection of the forum-selection clause to the
choice-of-law clause.60 These changes might bear on what law should
govern. Each increases the arguments for applying the chosen law. But it
is important that none of the changes addresses the forum’s meta-interest
in making the decision. It is the seised court that must resolve a true
choice-of-law problem: which sovereign’s law should draw the line
between sovereign interest and party autonomy? The seised court still
has the predominant interest in deciding. So, the answer remains the
same: lex fori, even for a prorogation contract between domestic parties
making an explicit choice of law.
C. Enforceability Versus Interpretation
The third step in the analysis is to decide just how far to go with the
application of lex fori. A clear view of the actual choice-of-law problem
reveals that lex fori should not trump the chosen law as to everything.
Among other possible limitations,61 it is conceivable that the law applicable
to legal questions of interpretation could differ from the law applicable to
enforceability of the forum-selection clause.
The prime example of an interpretation problem would be deciding
the scope of the clause. Some federal courts say things like, “Moreover,
because enforcement of a forum clause necessarily entails interpretation
of the clause before it can be enforced, federal law also applies to
interpretation of forum selection clauses.”62 But in fact, there is no
logical compulsion to first determine what precisely a forum-selection
clause means without looking to the chosen law.63 A court could logically
look to the chosen law to see what the forum-selection clause means as to
its coverage, and then apply lex fori to determine whether the construed
clause is enforceable.

believe that this distinction rarely will affect a court’s decision to enforce a forum selection clause.”
(citation omitted)); Yackee, supra note 6, at 85–86 (citing cases that arguably showed greater willingness to
apply domestic chosen law).
60. See Born, supra note 15, at 138–39 (suggesting that expressly designating the law applicable
to the forum-selection clause would help to achieve the application of the chosen law); Born &
Rutledge, supra note 4, at 543 (same).
61. One possibility would be distinguishing usual forum-selection clauses from clauses that
distinguish among the courts of the chosen forum state. See, e.g., Rudgayzer v. Google, Inc., 986 F. Supp.
2d 151, 153–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying federal law to the general enforceability of “You and Google
agree to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts located within the county of Santa Clara,
California,” but allowing California law to govern the legality of a choosing a particular state court in
California). But this is really a different issue, and normally the question of enforceability of the choice
among the courts of the destination state would be adjudicated only after suit is brought in that state.
62. Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988).
63. See Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 222 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Yet we see nothing to
prevent a court from first interpreting the forum selection clause under the law selected by the
contracting parties to determine whether it is mandatory and encompasses the claims and parties at
issue in the case, before turning to federal law to determine whether the clause should be enforced.”).
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So, what law should govern the interpretation of a forum-selection
clause? The interests shift as we leave enforceability. On interpretation,
the arguments that the seised court should use its own law on jurisdiction
and venue lose their determinative force. The seised court can let any
law determine what the parties agreed, and then apply lex fori to decide
whether the agreement is enforceable and thus affects its jurisdiction and
venue. Meanwhile, the interests behind applying the chosen law persist
and even increase. First, there is the background policy of indulging
party autonomy unless inappropriate. Second, there are the other usual
arguments in favor of giving the parties the power to choose the governing
law, such as curbing forum shopping. Third, there is the argument that
the forum-selection clause should have the same interpretation everywhere;
we do not want the clause to mean one thing here and another thing
there. For example, it would be unfortunate to dismiss the pending action
here based on one reading of the clause only to send it to another court
that reads the clause differently.
I am now in a position to generalize. The law of the chosen court
should normally govern interpretation of the forum-selection clause even
in the absence of a choice-of-law clause.64 One could defend this rule by
interpreting the forum-selection clause as an implicit choice-of-law clause
for matters relating to the forum-selection clause itself or as the best way
to conform to the parties’ expectations.65 Additionally, one could defend
the rule as a way to avoid the conflicts process’s difficulty and uncertainty
on the preliminary question of the appropriate forum or as the only way
to achieve a universal reading of the forum-selection clause.66

64. Lex fori would govern interpretation if the forum-selection clause is unclear as to which is the
chosen court, just as it would if a choice-of-law clause is unclear as to which is the chosen law. See
Proyecfin de Venez., S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venez., S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 395–96 (2d Cir. 1985) (using
lex fori, in absence of a choice-of-law clause, to interpret which court was chosen by conflicting forumselection clauses). Similarly, if the forum reads the forum-selection clause as nonexclusive, so that there is
no one chosen court’s law, the court should apply lex fori for interpretation. See Int’l Ass’n of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union 348 v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370, 372
(W.D. Pa. 1979) (using lex fori, in absence of a choice-of-law clause, to interpret forum-selection clause as
nonexclusive); Garnett, supra note 41, at 105 (getting to the same result by saying that there “are two
distinct aspects to the issue of interpretation: the first is whether the clause is ‘exclusive’ or ‘non-exclusive’
and the second is whether the clause, as a matter of scope, applies to the claims”). It is conceivable that
the forum would read the clause as exclusive, and so the forum would apply the chosen court’s law, which
happens to read the clause as nonexclusive; the nonexclusive reading would then prevail. The generalizing
idea is that lex fori governs forum-selection agreements, unless the parties make an explicit or implicit
choice of another law for interpretation.
65. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. a (1988) (“But even when the
contract does not refer to any state, the forum may nevertheless be able to conclude from its provisions
that the parties did wish to have the law of a particular state applied.”); cf. Yackee, supra note 6, at 90–94
(noting also that courts and arbiters treat choice of place of arbitration as an implicit choice of law).
66. A logical problem might seem to appear in looking to the chosen court’s law for interpretation
before determining the forum-selection clause’s enforceability. However, if one looks to the chosen
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The pressure for a universal reading implies that “the chosen law”
or “the law of the chosen court” should mean its whole law, including its
conflicts rules.67 Whenever one looks to foreign law on interpreting a forumselection clause, one is looking for how the foreign court would read it.
One must unearth which law the foreign court would actually apply to
the forum-selection clause. Then all courts can reach the same result. Of
course, the foreign court will normally apply its own law, so observing
this nicety of applying its whole law is of mainly theoretical significance.68
In conclusion, the entire rule would be to apply the whole lex fori on

enforceability while applying the whole chosen law or chosen court’s law
on interpretation of the forum-selection agreement, regardless of

whether there is a choice-of-law clause.69 In fact, viewing the problem in its
entirety augments clarity. Rather than just addressing the problem at
hand, the Second Circuit has begun more broadly stating its entire rule as
a premise. In Martinez v. Bloomberg LP,70 which is likely to become the
leading case, the Second Circuit laid out its reasoning at length:
court’s law for interpretation and then decides the clause is enforceable, one has looked to the right law
for interpretation. If one instead decides nonenforceability, one need not further pursue interpretation.
67. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 8(2) cmt. h (1988); Richman et al., supra
note 53, at 183–85; cf. Hague Convention, supra note 11, art. 6(a) (proposing treaty that would look at
law of the chosen court for some aspects of contractual validity, namely, whether “the agreement is
null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court”); id. art. 9(a) (doing the same in the
situation of recognition and enforcement). The Convention would give the existence of effective
agreement to lex fori, as well as the clause’s interpretation, but the chosen court’s law would
determine what law governs defenses to its enforcement. See Brand & Herrup, supra note 11, at 20,
79–82, 87–90 (saying that the reference to the chosen court’s law is a reference to its whole law, including
its conflicts rules); Trevor Hartley & Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague
Choice of Court Agreements Convention ¶ 149 (2013) (explaining that the Hague Convention’s
looking at the chosen court’s law “helps to ensure that the court seised and the chosen court give
consistent judgments on the validity of the choice of court agreement”). By contrast, courts in most
other situations look only to the local (or internal) law of the foreign system, not the foreign conflicts
rules, to avoid renvoi. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(3) (1988) (“In the
absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference [in a choice-of-law clause] is to the local
law of the state of the chosen law.”); Hay et al., supra note 11, at 1137.
68. Likewise, reference to “lex fori” means the forum’s whole law, including its conflict rules. So,
the seised court conceivably could formulate an explicit choice of other law to govern particular issues.
Compare Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 198 (1988) (choosing generally the law
governing a contract to govern the capacity of the parties to the contract), with Hague Convention,
supra note 11, art. 6(b) (proposing treaty that would look to “the law of the State of the court seised”
for determining the capacity of the parties to a forum-selection agreement).
69. See Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 385–86 (2d Cir. 2007) (dictum) (“We find less
to recommend the invocation of federal common law to interpret the meaning and scope of a forum
clause . . . . Little discussion of the issue can be found in federal court decisions. . . . [W]e cannot understand
why the interpretation of a forum selection clause should be singled out for application of any law other
than that chosen to govern the interpretation of the contract as a whole.” (citations omitted)); AVC
Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P’ship, 740 F.2d 148, 155–56 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying chosen Dutch law
to interpret mandatoriness of clause, but federal law for its enforceability); Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice of Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 321 (1990) (stressing the need for rules).
70. 740 F.3d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that “where a contract contains both a valid choiceof-law clause and a forum selection clause, the substantive law identified in the choice-of-law clause
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Where a contract contains both a choice-of-law and a choice-of-forum
clause, does federal law or the body of law specified in the choice-oflaw clause govern the effect of the choice-of-forum clause in an action
brought in a federal district court?
In answering this question, we distinguish between the
interpretation of a forum selection clause and the enforceability of the
clause. . . .
. . . Furthermore, “federal law should be used to determine whether
an otherwise mandatory and applicable forum clause is enforceable
under Bremen . . . .” In answering the interpretive questions posed . . . ,
however, we normally apply the body of law selected in an otherwise
valid choice-of-law clause. Hence, if we are called upon to determine
whether a particular forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive,
or whether its scope encompasses the claims or parties involved in a
certain suit, we apply the law contractually selected by the parties.
This approach reconciles respect for contracting parties’ legitimate
expectations with other important federal policies. If the enforceability
of a forum selection clause were governed by the law specified in the
choice-of-law clause, then contracting parties would have an absolute
right to “oust the jurisdiction” of the federal courts. . . .
The presumptive enforceability of forum selection clauses reflects a
strong federal public policy of its own, which would likewise be
undermined if another body of law were allowed to govern the
enforceability of a forum selection clause. . . .
....
It would undermine the predictability fostered by forum selection
clauses, however, if federal law—rather than the law specified in a
choice-of-law clause—were to govern the interpretation as well as the
enforceability of a forum selection clause. . . . To ensure that the
meaning given to a forum selection clause corresponds with the parties’
legitimate expectations, courts must apply the law contractually chosen
by the parties to interpret the clause.
Distinguishing between the enforceability and the interpretation of
forum selection clauses, moreover, accords with the traditional divide
between procedural and substantive rules . . . .
. . . The demand for a uniform federal standard governing the
enforceability of a forum selection clause is especially strong in an
international context, as here. . . .
There is no similar federal interest, however, in overriding parties’
contractually chosen body of law in favor of uniform federal rules
governing the interpretation of forum selection clauses. . . . Contract
law—including the rules governing contract interpretation—is
quintessentially substantive . . . .71

governs the interpretation of the forum selection clause, while federal law governs the enforceability
of the forum selection clause”).
71. Id. at 217–21 (citations omitted) (quoting Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d
Cir. 2007)).
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This case’s clarity generates hope that other courts will henceforth see
the problem in its fullness, and the case law will thereby fall more evidently
into ever increasing uniformity.72

III. Fit with Other Doctrines
Both the case law and the conflicts policies tip toward applying lex
fori for enforceability while applying the explicitly or implicitly chosen
law for interpretation. This Part demonstrates that this approach to forumselection clauses conforms with related areas in the law, selecting three
areas that are so closely related as to be overlapping.
A. ERIE
The first related problem is whether state or federal law governs
forum-selection clauses in a diversity case, or in any other federal case
that might involve state law. Although the two settings are very similar,
this Erie setting of vertical choice of law differs from the horizontal
setting discussed in Parts I and II because Erie poses preliminary and
final questions: First, does federal or state law get to decide whether it is a
local law or the chosen law that governs enforceability or interpretation?
Second, there is the usual horizontal question of what the federal or state
law says about the conflicts choice between local and chosen law. Third,
where lex fori applies, to what extent does state substantive law infiltrate
the forum-selection law of the federal forum?
State law could conceivably play a big role in regard to the vertical
questions.73 In related contexts, state law does get a vertical role:74 under
Erie, state law plays a role in federal court on the enforceability of
arbitration clauses75 and a bigger role on the enforceability of choice-of-

72. See, e.g., Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 648–51 (4th Cir. 2010)
(applying chosen English law to interpret mandatoriness of clause, but federal law for its
enforceability); Brenner v. Nat’l Outdoor Leadership Sch., No. 13-02908, 2014 WL 2069364, at *5 (D.
Minn. 2014) (“Although enforceability of a forum selection clause is analyzed under federal law,
where there exist both valid forum selection and choice-of-law clauses, the substantive law identified
in the choice-of-law clause governs interpretation of the forum selection clause.”).
73. See, e.g., Kelly Amanda Blair, Note, A Judicial Solution to the Forum-Selection Clause
Enforcement Circuit Split: Giving Erie a Second Chance, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 799, 817 (2012) (“Under Byrd
[v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc, 365 U.S. 525 (1958)], the outcome-determinative
nature of the conflict between federal versus state law and the absence of any overwhelming federal
policies on point dictate that, in line with the goals of Erie, state law controls the enforcement of
forum-selection clauses.”); Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or
Procedural for Erie Purposes, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1068, 1084 (1989) (arguing for state law, while
admitting the majority of federal cases go for federal law).
74. See supra notes 46–47 (describing the horizontal question in the contexts of arbitration and
choice-of-law clauses).
75. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (holding that state law governs
enforceability of an arbitration clause in an intrastate contract); Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at
1166 (discussing applicable state law on contract defenses).
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law clauses.76 However, the policy arguments as to forum-selection
clauses stay pretty much the same as we shift from the horizontal question
to the vertical questions. The forum maintains strong interests in controlling
its own jurisdiction, venue, and procedure through its conflicts and
enforceability doctrines. Still, the state’s substantive interests for and
against party autonomy will have some claim to applicability under Erie,
especially as to interpretation.
What do the cases say? The case law looks far from settled, if the
cases are viewed as an undifferentiated mass.77 But drawing some basic
distinctions again makes sense of the cases.
As to enforceability, most diversity cases look to federal law.78 That
is, the federal court uses federal law to decide which law governs
enforceability, federal law chooses lex fori, and lex fori is mainly the
federal law of enforceability. The cases do not stop with the simplistic
thought that state law governs contracts. They realize that these are
special contracts on forum allocation. The federal forum has strong interests
in discretionarily controlling its own jurisdiction, venue, and procedure,

76. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 772.
77. See Kendra Johnson Panek, Forum Selection Clauses in Diversity Actions, 36 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 941, 944 (2003); Yackee, supra note 6, at 65–67.
78. See, e.g., Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 826–28 (6th Cir. 2009) (deciding in favor
of federal law, but noting that a few circuits favor state law); Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 962
(5th Cir. 1997) (“Federal law applies to the [forum-selection or choice-of-law] clause enforceability
determination.”); Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906
F.2d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying federal law to determine whether the forum-selection clause was
enforceable); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Questions of venue and the
enforcement of forum selection clauses are essentially procedural, rather than substantive, in
nature.”); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512–13 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding
“federal law applies in our analysis of the effect and scope of the forum selection clause”); Sun World
Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding alternatively “that
the enforceability of a forum clause (venue limitation) is clearly a federal procedural issue and that
federal law controls”); Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1196 (4th Cir. 1985)
(“While The Bremen is an admiralty case involving an international contract, this Court has applied its
reasoning in diversity cases not involving international contracts.”); Strategic Mktg. & Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Kmart Corp., 41 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Precedent is clear, however, that in diversity
cases such as this one, federal common law governs the enforcement of forum selection clauses.”);
Moretti & Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Assocs., 668 F. Supp. 103, 105–06 (D.R.I. 1987) (holding that
federal—rather than state—law must govern venue selection); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp.,
474 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (applying federal law to enforceability and interpretation
because “[w]here suit will lie in the federal system is peculiarly the concern of the federal courts”);
Born & Rutledge, supra note 4, at 532 n.176, 539–43 (saying that most federal cases apply federal law,
often without discussion); Casad & Hines, supra note 58, § 4.19 (saying broadly that federal law
controls); 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3803.1 (4th ed.
2013) (collecting cases); Young Lee, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in
Diversity Cases and State Courts, 37 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 663, 676 (1997) (“[A] majority of the
federal courts have applied federal law where state law should have applied.”). But see Alexander
Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916–19 (11th Cir. 1989) (viewing the
clause in terms of personal jurisdiction and applying state law); Rindal v. Seckler Co., 786 F. Supp. 890,
893–94 (D. Mont. 1992) (viewing Montana’s prohibition of forum-selection clauses as a public policy).
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which should prevail over comparable state interests on such matters.79
A powerful additional argument for federal law’s major role in federal
court is that the Supreme Court has indicated that the federal statutes on
transfer of venue80 or the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens81 can
override the forum-selection clause, even in a diversity case.82
In a more detailed answer to the third question above, federal law
controls both enforceability in principle and contractual validity of the
separable forum-selection agreement. Recall that validity includes issues
like lack of assent and unconscionability, which really involve the
circumstances where the forum will let the parties override its jurisdiction,
venue, or procedure.83 However, any state law of specifically substantive
public policy, such as that embodied in a state statute protecting franchisees
from having to litigate claims in an out-of-state court, will supplement
that federal law in federal court.84 Although the federal forum has strong

79. See Julia L. Erickson, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and
Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1090, 1111–12
(1988) (arguing that federal law “would promote uniformity to enhance contract predictability and
would facilitate the fairness and federalism concerns that underlie the Erie doctrine” while “a state
court’s parochial interest in preventing jurisdiction ousting is not the type of substantive right that Erie
sought to protect”). The contrary arguments in favor of state law stress that state law usually governs
contracts and that application of federal law would have outcome-determinative effects. See Born &
Rutledge, supra note 4, at 538–39; Sorensen, supra note 6, at 2546–49, 2553–56 (arguing for applying
state law on validity). I am not saying that the Erie analysis is an easy one in theory. See Stephen E.
Sachs, Five Questions After Atlantic Marine, 66 Hastings L.J. 761, 765–68 (2015). Indeed, academics
with their own Erie theory tend to favor state law. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, Atlantic Marine
Through the Lens of Erie, 66 Hastings L.J. 795 (2015); Symposium, Case One: Choice of Forum
Clauses, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 517 (1995) (revealing split, while most of the participants favored state
law). But the academics manage to do so by disregarding the case law, which resolves the Erie
question in favor of federal law on the view that the outcome-determinative effect and the nonspecific
state interests regarding agreement on state forum do not overcome the federal interests in controlling
federal jurisdiction, venue, and procedure.
80. In the view of some, the recent § 1404 cases settle much of the Erie debate. E.g., Mullenix, supra
note 3, at 333 (saying that Ricoh “definitively answered the Erie question” in favor of federal law).
81. Forum non conveniens poses a very similar Erie problem. For the proposition that federal law
controls forum non conveniens in federal court even in diversity cases, see Kevin M. Clermont, The
Story of Piper: Forum Matters, in Civil Procedure Stories 199, 221 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed.
2008).
82. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text. Moreover, if the United States were to sign,
ratify, and implement a treaty on forum-selection clauses that then came into force, the result would
be to legislate the application of federal law and thus to moot the Erie debate. See supra note 11.
83. See Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that federal law governs whether
“the clause was obtained through fraud or overreaching”).
84. See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2000) (declining to
enforce forum-selection clause because “it contravened California’s strong public policy against
enforcing such clauses in franchise agreements,” after first saying, “[i]n diversity cases, federal law
governs the analysis of . . . forum selection clauses”); Tri-State Found. Repair & Waterproofing, Inc. v.
Permacrete Sys., Ltd., No. 99-1132-CV-W-6, 2000 WL 245824 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2000) (similar); Jason
A. Lien, Forum-Selection Clauses in Construction Agreements: Strategic Considerations in Light of
the Supreme Court’s Pending Review of Atlantic Marine, Construction Law., Summer 2013, at 27, 30
(many states prohibit forum-selection clauses in certain industries, like construction); cf. Preferred
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interests in controlling its own jurisdiction, venue, and procedure,
specifically substantive state interests can occasionally be strong enough
to shift the balance and so call for state law to apply under Erie.
As to legal questions on interpretation of the clause, state law tends
to apply in diversity cases.85 That is, the federal court uses the law of the
forum state to decide which law governs interpretation, the forum state
would select a law of interpretation under its rules for choice of law, and
the selected law applies in federal court.86 The federal court has no great
interest in controlling interpretation, and in the Erie setting, the federal
court should defer in favor of state law rather than formulate the optimal

Capital, Inc. v. Sarasota Kennel Club, Inc., 489 F.3d 303, 308 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying unspecified
Ohio public policy); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th
Cir. 1986) (applying unspecified Missouri public policy); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva Zapata!:
Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 422, 449–50 (1991) (“Some states view forum-selection clauses as contrary to public policy,
thus raising a conflict between state and federal law in diversity cases.”). In the horizontal setting, the
seised court does not look to the chosen court’s public policy. See supra note 54. This results from the
fact that the chosen court’s public policy has no bearing on the seised court’s decision regarding its
own jurisdiction or venue. But in the Erie setting, the state’s substantive policies have a call on the
federal court’s law, provided that they are specifically substantive rather than some general policy
against forum-selection agreements. One might call such provisions “super-mandatory” rules. See
O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 29, at 62–64, 219–22 (describing provisions that trump any specific
attempts to escape local law).
85. See Dunne v. Libbra, 330 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying state law to construe
clause as nonexclusive). Some cases do apply federal law to interpretation. See, e.g., Manetti-Farrow,
Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512–13 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[F]ederal law applies in our analysis of the
effect and scope of the forum selection clause.”). But often these cases turn on uncovering intent, diving
into which the courts feel comfortable without much of a choice-of-law process. See, e.g., Wells Fargo
Century, Inc. v. Brown, 475 F. Supp. 2d 368, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In general, a clause is mandatory if its
language indicates the parties’ intent that only one forum could decide their disputes.”); Taylor v. Titan
Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 148 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (saying, as to mandatoriness, that “the
language reveals an intention to designate that county as the only place where suits on the contracts may
be brought”); cf. supra note 39 (making similar point in the non-Erie setting).
86. See TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Grp. Ltd., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1075
(D. Kan. 2006) (“Thus, under Kansas law, the parties’ contractually chosen law, which is the law of
The Netherlands, governs interpretation of the forum selection clause.”), aff’d on other grounds, 488
F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2007); Global Link, LLC. v. Karamtech Co., No. 06-CV-14938, 2007 WL 1976147,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 3, 2007) (looking to state law that would apply chosen Korean law for interpretation
of mandatoriness of clause); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1140, 1143–44
(W.D. Va. 1979) (holding that Virginia law would require chosen Arizona law to apply to forumselection clause); Taylor, 474 F. Supp. at 147 n.2 (dictum) (“This court would have to determine
whether under Texas conflicts law, this dispute is a matter of venue or a matter of contract law. If the
former, Texas choice-of-law rules would dictate application of the law of the forum state, i.e., Texas. If
under Texas conflicts law this were viewed as primarily a question of contract law, then arguably a
Texas court would apply Missouri law to its resolution, in view of the contractual choice-of-law
provision.”); Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial
Agreements, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 133, 155–56 (“The answer to this question must be found in the
conflict-of-laws rules of the forum state and depends on the characterization of the question of
enforceability of forum-selection clauses, this time by the forum state in which the federal court sits.”
(citation omitted)).
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choice-of-law or interpretation rule itself. Uniformity of outcome between
federal and state court thus results.
There is, of course, an analogous reverse-Erie question as to the role
of federal law in state court. So, switch from federal court to a forumselection clause question arising in state court. First, in state law cases in
state court, enforceability works out the normal way, in favor of lex fori;
thus, in state court, the governing law is usually the state’s law.87 The
same is true even in international or admiralty cases,88 despite the
tenable reverse-Erie argument that federal interests call for the
application of federal law in these state cases.89 The reason is that any
interests in foreign relations, international commerce, or substantive law
appear weaker upon closer inspection, as forum-selection clauses really
present a jurisdiction, venue, or procedure issue. Second, interpretation
should follow state choice of law, which often leads to the law of the
parties’ choosing.90
Both federal and state courts, then, mainly apply lex fori for
enforceability while applying the chosen law for interpretation of forumselection agreements. In sum, a strong argument in support of this
Article’s solution is that largely the same approach applies in the Erie
and reverse-Erie settings.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Clauses
Given that the governing law on forum-selection agreements
depends on whether the parties are in federal or state court, the incentive
exists for them to maneuver on the federal/state axis to get into the more
favorable forum. I therefore need to switch from forum selection in terms
of territorial adjudicatory authority to forum selection in terms of subject
matter jurisdiction. This latter is a different problem from those addressed
in Parts I and II, because concerns of federalism inject themselves here.
Nevertheless, the same insight (the decision in question here is which
87. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1980) (rejecting under
Alabama law the choice of a Florida forum and saying, “[p]arties may not confer jurisdiction by
consent, nor may they limit the jurisdiction of a court by consent”), overruled by Prof’l Ins. Corp. v.
Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 352 (Ala. 1997) (accepting forum-selection agreements as a matter of state
law); Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entm’t Inc., 209 S.E.2d 132, 133 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (“Under
[Georgia law], a provision of a contract fixing the venue of an action on the contract as to future
litigation is void as contrary to public policy.”), disapproved in Harry S. Peterson Co. v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co., 434 S.E.2d 778, 782–83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (accepting forum-selection agreements as a
matter of state law); Lee, supra note 78, at 681.
88. See, e.g., Zurich Ins. Co. v. Allen, 436 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (applying
state law in international case to ignore forum-selection clause), overruled by Manrique v. Fabbri, 493
So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. 1986) (accepting forum-selection agreements, apparently as a matter of state law).
89. See Prado v. Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts, A.G., 611 So. 2d 691, 693–94 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
(applying federal law to uphold choice of Philippines forum in maritime case); Kevin M. Clermont,
Reverse-Erie, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (2006).
90. See supra note 86.
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sovereign should get to draw the line on forum selection) reveals how this
Article’s solution (applying lex fori for enforceability while applying the
chosen law for interpretation of the forum-selection agreement) fits
comfortably not only with Erie, but also with the law on subject matter
jurisdiction agreements—both employ a conflicts solution like this
Article’s, except for particularized federalist overrides.
Parties agreeing to a federal forum seem to present no special
problem, as long as the federal court otherwise has subject matter
jurisdiction.91 That is, the parties may renounce the subject matter
jurisdiction of state court, but they may not by agreement bestow federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Courts have come to view a clause choosing a
federal court with subject matter jurisdiction as an ordinary forumselection agreement, blessed by the tolerance of modern law for such
agreements. The clause should be subject to the usual choice-of-law rules
for forum-selection agreements, including lex fori on enforceability.
Parties agreeing to a state forum, however, do make courts more
nervous. Still, the law has evolved. Parties today may agree that an
action, which is not within exclusive federal jurisdiction, will proceed in
state court but not in federal court.92 That is, the parties may renounce
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Bringing suit in state court pursuant
to the agreement will not present an issue. However, the enforceability
of such an agreement could arise in federal court either after removal by
the defendant93 or after original suit by the plaintiff,94 if done in violation
of the agreement. The federal court will then apply federal law on the
enforceability issue. Although federal courts arguably should apply state
law on interpretation of the agreement, they typically construe the clause
without pausing on choice of law.95

91. See Schlessinger v. Holland Am., N.V., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2004). In Schlessinger, the
California Court of Appeal dismissed the state action pursuant to the following contractual provision:
All disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this
contract . . . shall be litigated, if at all, in and before the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington at Seattle, or, as to those lawsuits as to which the federal
courts of the United States lack subject matter jurisdiction, in the courts of King County,
State of Washington, U.S.A., to the exclusion of all other courts.

Id.
92. See 14B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3721 (4th ed.
2009); Michael D. Moberly, Judicial Protection of Forum Selection: Enforcing Private Agreements to
Litigate in State Court, 1 Phoenix L. Rev. 1, 18–21 (2008).
93. See Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. N.Y. Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 659–60 (2d Cir.
1988) (ordering remand).
94. See Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) (ordering dismissal).
95. E.g., Karl Koch Erecting Co., 838 F.2d at 659; O & G Carriers, Inc. v. Rosenthal & Co., 685 F.
Supp. 66, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); David S. Coale et al., Contractual Waiver of the Right to Remove to
Federal Court: How Policy Judgments Guide Contract Interpretation, 29 Rev. Litig. 327, 328–29
(2010) (saying that the circuits are split between applying ordinary interpretation rules and requiring
clear language of waiver of removal).
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Neither a state nor a federal court will enforce an agreement
selecting a state court for claims existing exclusively within federal
jurisdiction.96 There is, however, nothing preordained about this position.
After all, when a U.S. court upholds the selection of a foreign forum, it is
allowing the parties to waive even exclusive federal jurisdiction.97 So,
federal law could decide to enforce a state-court choice even as to
exclusive jurisdiction,98 but federal law has decided not to. Freedom of
contract is not to run wild. Just as for territorial jurisdiction and venue
agreements, lex fori puts limits on when the parties can agree to
derogation of subject matter jurisdiction. Courts read the congressional
command of exclusive federal jurisdiction as an implicit prohibition of
any contrary party agreement, as well as an implicit prohibition of any
contrary state law.
C. Customized Litigation
As it became more accepted in the 1960s that holders could waive
civil procedural rights,99 parties slowly started agreeing to create a
somewhat customized procedural system for their litigation.100 That is, if
the parties could waive important procedural protections by consent,
then they could likewise choose predispute101 or post-dispute102 to
customize their litigation, subject to the restraints of contract law and
only up to some vaguely defined limits centered on the idea that parties
can sign away their own rights but cannot intrude on third parties or on

96. See O & G Carriers, 685 F. Supp. at 67 (“Since, as noted, the Commodities Exchange Act
dictates that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction in private actions for damages under the
Act, a state forum is necessarily precluded.” (internal citation omitted)). Nor does federal law allow a
state court to accept jurisdiction on the basis of such an agreement. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Kinder, 640
S.W.2d 537, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (disallowing the parties to agree to jurisdiction in a state court
over a claim within exclusive federal jurisdiction).
97. See Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding English
forum for claims asserted under federal securities law).
98. See Moberly, supra note 92, at 39–55 (arguing that the federal court could stay its action until
the parties pursued any related concurrent jurisdiction claims in the selected state court).
99. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972) (approving cognovit note);
Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964) (approving the defendant’s waiver
in advance of objections to territorial jurisdiction); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private
Ordering, 97 Va. L. Rev. 723, 734–38 (2011).
100. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 Yale L.J. 814, 857 (2006) (describing customization of procedure as hitherto unexplored).
101. See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of
Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 579 (2007); cf. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon
Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures,
91 Tex. L. Rev. 1475 (2013) (warning about maintaining a proper time perspective when weighing
costs and benefits).
102. See Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 461, 495–501 (2007).
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sovereign interests.103 Of late, customization seems to have become a boom
industry.104 At the least, the literature on the subject has mushroomed,
whether championing the new freedom105 or stressing that limits exist to
cabin that freedom.106 “Proponents of a broad scope for party

103. See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice,
90 Tex. L. Rev. 1329, 1397–98 (2012) (recognizing limits “when parties expressly agree to exclude a third
party with legal rights that might be seriously affected, when the agreement is sharply one-sided and the
market has little competition, and when the agreement adopts procedures that seriously disable
private enforcement of the substantive law or impair the proper consideration of civil rights claims,” as
well as expressing concern for “party rulemaking that tinkers with procedures and rules closely tied to
the judge’s or the jury’s reasoning process”); Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for
Procedure, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 507, 513–15 (2011) (saying that “private transactions presumptively
are efficient only if there are no negative externalities, that is to say, no adverse effects on third
parties,” including lesser “production of public goods that play a critical role in shaping public policy,
encouraging social trust, and supporting democratic values,” but also recognizing that “agreements are
not always mutually beneficial to the parties and in some cases inappropriately extinguish
constitutional and statutory rights”); Moffitt, supra note 102, at 521 (“[T]he customized rule should
govern the litigation, provided the adaptation does not run afoul of the constitutional or statutory
provisions empowering the court, does not hurt the public’s legitimate interest in the litigation process,
and does not prejudice nonlitigants.”); Noyes, supra note 101, at 583 (recognizing limits “where
Congress has acted to affirmatively prohibit modification of a specific litigation rule”; “where the
agreement seeks to waive litigation rights of a person who is not a party to the contract, including the
public’s litigation rights”; and “where there is an overriding procedural consideration that prevents
enforcement of the contract because it would irreparably discredit the courts”); S.I. Strong, Limits of
Procedural Choice of Law, 39 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1027 (2014) (finding limits on procedural choice both
in structural concerns involving questions of institutional design and the old understanding of
sovereign prerogative over judicial affairs and also in substantive concerns focusing on individual
liberty and fundamental due process rights). Additionally, waiver of some constitutional rights is likely
subject to closer scrutiny. See Noyes, supra note 101, at 583, 635–36 (“[W]here the contract waives
certain constitutional rights, it may be unenforceable if it was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently.”).
104. See, e.g., Trial by Agreement: Agreements for Opposing Counsel, http://trialbyagreement.com
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015). But see David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 389 (showing that customization of procedure is not yet common in practice).
105. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 102, at 465 (arguing “for a radical expansion of litigants’
customization options”); Noyes, supra note 101, at 647 (“[T]his freedom of contract adds value to the
litigation rights.”); Scott & Triantis, supra note 100, at 856–60 (using economic analysis).
106. See, e.g., Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 103, at 507 (arguing that “contract procedure operates
as a form of privatization that effectively outsources government functions to private contracting
parties”); Dodge, supra note 99, at 729 (“The end of civil procedure as a mandatory guarantor of
procedural justice and its replacement by market forces has the capacity to reshape not only the role of
the private right of action between contracting parties but also the broad swath of statutory, constitutional,
and common law obligations that rely upon it as a primary mechanism of enforcement.”); Scott Dodson,
Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2014) (arguing generally against
party control); Mullenix, supra note 3, at 372 (“recognizing that the supremacy of contract principles in
civil law waiver has sacrificed fundamental litigation rights”); Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts
for Customized Litigation by the Norms Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 471, 527–30 (2013)
(arguing for a shift from contract norms to procedural norms); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil

Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need
of Congressional Control, 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1085, 1088 (2002) (arguing that courts “have
overlooked, if not forsaken, an underlying concern for fundamental fairness in favor of preservation of
contractual autonomy”); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. Disp. Resol. 181, 211
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rulemaking argue that the efficiency and autonomy benefits outweigh the
costs. Those who advocate strict limits place greater weight on the
potential unfairness to weaker parties and focus more strongly on risks to
adjudicative legitimacy and on other institutional costs.”107
Today, the parties might attempt to alter pleading rules,108 restrict
joinder or discovery, change the rules of evidence,109 waive jury trial,110
or limit or prohibit appeal. In fact, they could try to make litigation look
a lot like a peculiarly effective brand of arbitration,111 or they might
agree to abide in our courts by some set of transnationally “neutral”
rules of procedure.112 Many of the normal rules of procedure thus become
no more than default contractual rules, which the parties can extensively
modify through negotiation.113 In sum, the modern judicial trend is to
elevate freedom of contract to the full extent of parties’ waiving their
own rights, thereby discounting the old view that sovereign interests
resided in those rights.
Comprehension of the law on forum-selection agreements benefits
further from comparison to the law on customized litigation. The two
stories are different, as the former has much longer and distinctive historical
roots.114 But they share evolutionary pressures, as well as the tension
between sovereign interests and party autonomy.
The various legal systems’ growing acceptance of forum-selection
agreements, subject to certain limits, fits comfortably with the embrace
of freedom of contract in customized litigation. Likewise, applying the
chosen law to interpretation of the agreement conforms to modern
trends of empowering party customization. But this Article’s suggestion
to apply lex fori on enforceability of the forum-selection agreement
seems less consistent—especially when lex fori applies despite the
parties’ evident intent to choose another law to govern enforceability.

(“Decisions about procedure should not, however, be made irrevocably based on pre-dispute
bargaining power, behind a veil of ignorance, by parties considering only themselves.”).
107. Bone, supra note 103, at 1334 (finding these arguments “insufficiently theorized”).
108. See Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around Twombly, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 1,
1–2 (2010) (favoring such contracts).
109. See John W. Strong, Consensual Modifications of the Rules of Evidence: The Limits of Party
Autonomy in an Adversary System, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 159 (2001) (taking first steps in analyzing this
unexplored area).
110. See Amanda R. Szuch, Comment, Reconsidering Contractual Waivers of the Right to a Jury
Trial in Federal Court, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 435 (2010) (discussing Erie implications).
111. See Noyes, supra note 101, at 583–84; Charles W. Tyler, Note, Lawmaking in the Shadow of
the Bargain: Contract Procedure as a Second-Best Alternative to Mandatory Arbitration, 122 Yale
L.J. 1560, 1593 (2013).
112. See ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (2006).
113. See Moffitt, supra note 102, at 462 (“[T]he current set of procedural rules should be treated as
default rules, rather than as nonnegotiable parameters.”).
114. See Marcus, supra note 8, at 1042–48; supra Part I.B.
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To reconcile this application of lex fori, one needs to recall the limits
of the modern movement toward customized litigation. The law still
provides that the parties cannot customize certain matters. Quite simply,
forum selection is one such matter. The decision about how far to go in
accepting forum-selection agreements remains one for the sovereign, and
a difficult one. Recall further that the decision in question here is which
sovereign should get to draw the line on forum selection. This decision is
much more squarely of sovereign interest, so the choice of law remains
within the forum’s control, despite any attempt by the parties to contract
around it.
Thus, the same idea of expansion of party autonomy, up to certain
limits that respect sovereign interest, explains both the general development
of customized litigation and the specific resolution of the governing law
for forum-selection agreements. In each story the need to accommodate
tension results in drawing a line. Certain matters still remain beyond the
control of the parties.

Conclusion
Finally resolving this problem of governing law is important both
because big differences remain among legal systems’ law on forumselection agreements and because the parties’ pursuit of certainty through
agreement depends on having a clear conflicts backdrop upon which to
act. Courts and commentators that have confronted the problem show
far more confusion than is optimal or justifiable.
Years of judicial and academic contortions have hidden a simple
solution to the problem of governing law on forum-selection agreements.
Case law, policy arguments, and doctrinal consistency all support applying
lex fori on enforceability of the forum-selection agreement. Contrariwise,
the chosen law, if there is a choice-of-law clause, or the law of the chosen
court, if there is no choice-of-law clause, should apply to interpretation
of the forum-selection agreement.
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